ArticuLaw Primo

GR No. L-26462

Teresita C Yaptinchay v. Hon Judge Guillermo Torres 

 

 

Facts:

 

    On July 13, 1965, herein petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay sought in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, her appointment first as administratrix of the estate of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay.

 

   She alleged that the deceased Isidro Y. Yaptinchay had lived with her continuously, openly and publicly as husband and wife.

 

    That on July 7, 8 and 11, 1965, certain parties carted away from the residences aforesaid personal properties belonging to the deceased together with others exclusively owned by Teresita Yaptichay. It was averred that in these circumstances the appointment of a special administrator to take custody and care of the interests of the deceased pending appointment of a regular administrator became an urgent necessity wherein Teresita C. Yaptinchay was designated as special administratrix.

 

   An opposition was filed by Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, upon the ground that the petitioner had no right to institute the proceeding for the settlement of the latter's estate, much less to procure appointment as administratrix thereof; and that having admittedly cohabited with the deceased for a number of years said petitioner was not qualified to serve as administratrix for want of integrity.

 

   To give oppositors an opportunity to be heard, the probate court, on July 19, 1965, set aside its order of July 17, 1965 appointing petitioner Teresita C. Yaptinchay special administratrix.

 

   On July 30, 1965, after the parties were heard, the probate court granted counter-petitioners' prayer and named Virginia Y. Yaptinchay special administratrix upon a P50, 000-bond.

 

  The Court also orders the plaintiff to cease and desist from disturbing in any manner whatsoever the defendant Virginia Y. Yaptinchay in the possession of said property.

 

 

Issue:

 

Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Rizal in the exercise of its supervisory powers committed grave abuse of discretion. 

 

 

Held:

 

     As well established is the rule that the grant or denial of an injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court, in the exercise of which appellate courts will not interfere except in a clear case of abuse.

 

   Not one of the promissory notes presented by the petitioner mentioned reveals use of the proceeds for the construction of the North Forbes Park house.

 

   It is in the context just recited that the unsupported assertion that the North Forbes Park house is petitioner's exclusive property may not be permitted to override the prima facie presumption that house, having been constructed on the lot of Isidro Y. Yaptinchay (or of the conjugal partnership) at his instance, and during the existence of his marriage with respondent Josefina Y. Yaptinchay, is part of the estate that should be under the control of the special administratrix.

 

   But one such condition is that there must be a clear showing that the petitioner had, during cohabitation, really contributed to the acquisition of the property involved. Until such right to co-ownership is duly established, petitioner's interests in the property in controversy cannot be considered the "present right" or title that would make available the protection or aid afforded by a writ of injunction.

 

  At any rate, it would seem to us that the interests of the parties would be better safeguarded if the controverted North Forbes Park property be in the hands of the bonded administratrix in the estate proceedings. For then, her acts would be subject to the control of the probate court.

 

  Finding no error in the disputed orders of respondent judge, the herein petition for certiorari is hereby dismissed, and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction 17 issued by this Court is hereby dissolved and set aside.